The ‘buy-American’ push is backfiring

But Trump’s love for U.S. weapons, and for foreign arms sales, is increasingly putting some of his other policy goals at risk.

In Europe, the administration is pursuing a contradictory policy: demanding that European states spend and do more for their own defense—while simultaneously insisting that those funds are spent on U.S. armaments. This is already provoking a backlash from European elites and could slow down or even derail the administration’s push for greater European self-reliance in defense. Over time, a strong Europe that can defend itself would be a win for the United States, even if it comes at the cost of defense industry profits.

The Trump administration has made clear that it wants greater European defense capabilities. As Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told European allies earlier this year, “safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO.” The administration has backed this rhetoric with action, briefly pulling back on U.S. support for Ukraine, and pressuring European states to spend up to five percent of GDP on defense.

And for once, Europe appears to be taking U.S. talk about burden-sharing seriously. In April, the incoming German government struck a deal to loosen the so-called “debt brake,” allowing for more defense spending, a step that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. Twenty-three NATO members now spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, and the European Commission has put in place a “ReArm Europe” initiative to coordinate and assist members with defense procurement. 

Throughout this process, however, the Trump administration has continued to push allies to buy U.S.-made weapons, both for themselves and for Ukraine. Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested at a recent meeting of European officials that attempts to exclude American defense companies from major European arms investments would be “seen negatively by Washington,” a clear warning against the EU’s ReArm project and the Commission’s incentives to favor European companies. 

This has been longstanding U.S. policy towards Europe. In 2019, the first Trump administration authored a letter to the European Commission warning against restrictions on foreign armaments under PESCO—one of the EU’s core joint defense industrial initiatives—and even threatened retaliation against European arms manufacturers.

It also fits with the administration’s broader emphasis on selling U.S. companies and investment overseas, from the tariff war to the president’s recent visit to the Gulf States. During the president’s first term, the White House often highlighted new arms sales agreements as major successes and encouraged the State Department to press U.S. allies to buy American in defense.

Today, however, pushing Europe to buy American is distinctly problematic. Such pressure helps to create divisions between European states over whether they should buy American or invest internally in Europe, making it harder to establish consensus; it also undermines the creation of cross-European mechanisms to bolster defense spending. For example, Germany’s decision to buy F-35s has irked French officials, who argue that the purchase undermines the European arms industry and could block the further development of the Future Combat Air System, a joint European fighter jet project.

The French are at least partly correct: pushing Europeans to only buy American is likely to threaten the development of a robust defense industrial base that could support self-reliant European defense Trump officials clearly favor. Perhaps more importantly, it could undermine the process of burden-shifting to these states: if European leaders cannot sell politically unpopular policies—such as increased defense spending—to the public as domestic investment, they may struggle to increase spending at all.

But buying American sometimes makes sense. While European defense firms are growing substantially – by nearly 17 percent in 2023 alone – there are still systems they do not produce or cannot yet produce at scale. And if European states do indeed spend 5 percent of GDP on defense in coming years, the continent’s defense industry will simply be unable to absorb it in the short term.

So there is little doubt that American arms sales to Europe will continue to be robust for years. It’s also increasingly clear that America’s own industrial base is struggling to meet the needs of the military and our allies. A stronger European defense-industrial base could help move us towards a more integrated transatlantic defense ecosystem, leveraging the economic strengths of allies to meet common defense needs.

In deciding whether to buy European or American, policymakers need to think carefully about what needs to be bought now for security—and what needs investment in the longer-term, like air defense systems or long-range strike capabilities. This will require coordination, and a willingness for American leaders to look past the short-term logic of increased arms sales to longer-term strategic interests. 

The Trump administration has made great strides in encouraging NATO allies to spend more on defense. In doing so, they can claim at least some victory in a struggle that has frustrated practically every administration since NATO’s inception.

But if the president wishes to preserve and advance this win, the administration will need to take a more nuanced view on arms sales: proclaim necessary arms sales as significant wins for the United States but stop pushing European allies to simply “buy American” in every circumstance. Americans and Europeans alike will both benefit from it in the long term.

Emma Ashford is an adjunct assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. ]]>